




Copyright @ 2017 
Australia and New Zealand Journal of European Studies 
https://cesaa.org.au/anzjes/ 
Vol9 (3) 
ISSN 1837-2147 (Print) 
ISSN 1836-1803 (On-line) 
 
Graeme Gill 
The University of Sydney 
graeme.gill@sydney.edu.au 
The Russian Revolution After One Hundred Years 
Abstract 
The Russian revolution was the defining episode of the twentieth century. It led to the transformation 
of Russia into one of the superpowers on the globe, but one that exhibited a development model that 
was both different from and a challenge to the predominant model in the West. The Soviet experiment 
offered a different model for organising society. This was at the basis of the way in which international 
politics in the whole post-second world war period was structured by the outcome of the Russian 
revolution. But in addition, that revolution helped to shape domestic politics in the West in very 
significant ways. All told, the revolution was of world historical and world shaping importance. 
Key words: cold war; communism; development models; left-wing politics; Russian revolution; 
socialism 
After one hundred years, the Russian revolution remains a matter of vigorous scholarly 
contention. Although in the eyes of many the evaluative question has been settled—the 
system of communism created by the revolution has failed—the question of how the 
revolution is to be understood remains a hot topic, as many of the publications that 
have come out around the centenary show. Is the revolution best seen as part of the 
general imperial collapse resulting from the First World War?1 Should it be seen as 
part of a European (Germany, Hungary) or a Eurasian (China, Iran, Turkey) wave of 
revolution?2 Some writers focus on the February revolution and its antecedents,3 some 
on the year 1917.4 Other authors frame the revolution as lasting up to 1921 and the New 
Economic Policy (NEP)5 or to the late 1920s when Stalin launched his “revolution from 
above”. 6  And many of the questions that have long agitated scholars remain; for 
example, was structure or agency more important, what was the role of German gold, 
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how important were the peasantry, and could the Provisional Government have 
avoided October? So the revolution remains an important matter of scholarly concern. 
However the revolution’s centenary has not enjoyed much public resonance in the 
West. Despite scholarly publications, conferences and seminars, there has been little 
in the way of public or official acknowledgement. Even in Russia, the home of the 
revolution and the core of the Soviet experiment, there has been no major marking of 
the centenary. On Putin’s direction,7 an organising committee was established in the 
Russian Historical Society with a brief to organise events surrounding the centenary, 
and it drew up a program of 118 events.8 However no national commemoration was 
organised. The anniversary of the February revolution passed without ceremony or 
celebration, while the events marking October were organised by the communist party 
rather than the state. This reflects official ambiguity about how the Soviet period fits 
into an emergent national narrative. One view as enunciated by President Vladimir 
Putin is that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe 
of the twentieth century9 because of the way in which it led to economic dislocation 
and hardship for the Russian people. The official view, such as it is, is that the Soviet 
period was one of great achievements but at extremely high cost, and that those 
achievements (especially victory in the war) should be celebrated; there is less 
enthusiasm for delving too deeply into the costs. This judgement has been explicit from 
Putin’s comments on the eve of taking up the presidency when he acknowledged the 
“unquestionable achievements” of the Soviet period but also the outrageous price and 
“historic futility”; communism was, he said, “a blind alley, far from the mainstream of 
civilisation.”10  
The problem the revolution poses for Putin is multi-dimensional. As the regime tries 
to mould a heroic narrative of the Russian past to feed into its legitimation program,11 
it seeks to wed aspects of the tsarist pre-Soviet era with the achievements of Soviet 
socialism. The revolution and the regime it produced, representing a rejection of tsarist 
Russia, fit awkwardly into this process. How can the undoubted achievements like 
industrialisation and victory in the war be included in a triumphalist national narrative 
when communism was also a “dead end” 12 that produced widespread unnecessary 
death and suffering?13 Striking the right balance is difficult, and therefore better not 
seek to try by largely ignoring the centenary, at least in a national symbolic fashion. 
Furthermore any glorification of revolution and popular mobilisation in the streets 
would sit awkwardly with Putin’s preoccupation with “colour revolution” and the 
                                                        
7 “Podpisano rasporiazhenie o provedenii meropriiatii k 100-letiiu revoliutsii 1917g”, 19 December 2016. 
www.rushistory.org (accessed 21 September 2017)  
8 These comprised exhibitions, publications, lectures, conferences and some media events. “Plan osnovnykh 
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13 For example, see Putin’s comments in Vremia novostei 13 October 2007. 
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dangers he sees this holds for the regime.14 So the official Russian attitude remains 
ambiguous.  
For the communists in Russia, the position is clear: the revolution is something that 
should be celebrated, it ushered in the building of a glorious future personified by 
Stalin, and it was cruelly destroyed by internal traitors.15 Among the populace, the view 
is mixed. For both conservatives and the liberal opposition, the revolution and 
subsequent Soviet period was a disaster. For many among the conservatives, including 
the Russian Orthodox Church, the revolution marked the end of the monarchy and a 
system which, they believed, was fully in tune with Russian culture and history, and 
should be restored.16 Liberals were appalled by the illegality and lack of freedom that 
was ushered in during Soviet times, seeing it as pushing Russia away from the main 
path of human development.17 More broadly, many feel a nostalgia for aspects of the 
Soviet period without necessarily wanting to restore Soviet rule,18 while many of the 
younger generation simply remain largely ignorant and apathetic; the Soviet period 
and the revolution that brought it about do not register on their horizons. So, apart 
from the communists, there has been no groundswell of popular support for 
remembering the revolution. 
Given the diversity of approaches to the revolution, how should we see it now, one 
hundred years on? In my view, it was the defining episode of the twentieth century. It 
was the revolution that set Russia on the particular path it was to follow for 74 years, 
and that shaped both global politics and the domestic politics of a large number of 
states, including the main Western ones. In this sense, the revolution was a century-
defining, world historic event. 
The Revolution and Russia 
The revolution involved the collapse of the 300 year old Romanov dynasty, and the 
monarchical system that had dominated Russia for hundreds of years before that, and, 
after an interregnum of some eight months, brought the Bolsheviks to power. Having 
consolidated themselves in power, they then introduced a program of sustained socio-
economic change which had industrialisation at its heart and raised the country to the 
level of a superpower within two generations. Had the revolution not occurred and the 
tsar continued to reign, Russia would still have industrialised, but it is a moot point as 
to whether it would have achieved the same levels as the Soviet program did in the 
same timescale. This argument, about whether the revolution was a long-term stimulus 
to Russian economic development or a major impediment to it, was a significant field 
of conflict between supporters and opponents of the revolution.19 But all agreed that 
                                                        
14 For an analysis of this and how it has affected Russian policy, see Robert Horvath, Putin’s Preventive Counter-
Revolution. Post-Soviet authoritarianism and the spectre of velvet revolution, London: Routledge, 2013. 
15 For the views of the party leader, see Gennadii Ziuganov, Stalin i sovremennost’, Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 
2009. 
16 Representative of this view was the novelist, Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Rebuilding 
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the Soviet program was very different from what a tsarist regime would have been 
likely to pursue. 
Central to the Soviet project was the desire to create a completely new civilisation based 
on a new type of socio-economic system. The Bolsheviks did not talk about it in such 
civilisational terms,20 but that is what they meant when they talked about the building 
of socialism/communism. Their openly espoused aim was the creation of a society 
characterised by freedom and equality, one in which the alienation and degradation of 
capitalism were superseded by the introduction of a socialist way of life characterised 
by the absence of exploitation and the presence of freedom, equality and material 
abundance. Accordingly, they were not content simply to industrialise and to let society 
develop along with this. Instead they sought to shape all aspects of people’s lives 
including what they believed, how they lived, and even how they spoke. Their aim was 
the fundamental transformation of society at all levels in an attempt to achieve 
essentially utopian goals. This aim clearly distinguished the post-revolutionary Soviet 
course from its potential tsarist competitor (at least as reflected in the tsarist 
development program in operation since the 1890s), as well as from what was 
happening elsewhere in the world; the Soviet regime was unique in its combination of 
transformative aim, highly centralised political and economic structures, and the 
extent of control the state sought to wield over society. Seeking nothing less than the 
creation of a “new Soviet man”, the Soviet state generated its own unique brand of 
modernity that was in sharp contrast to that rooted in capitalism.21 
Recognition of the idealistic aims behind the revolution has been obscured in the 
intervening century, principally because of the way that the Soviet enterprise fell far 
short of those ideals. Certainly there were many positive aspects of the Soviet 
experience: rising living standards, an established universal social and welfare net, the 
educational raising up of millions, rapid paced economic development, greater 
equality, the effective ending of illiteracy and unemployment, and the building of 
capacity that enabled victory in the Second World War. But there were also immense 
costs: the millions of dead over and above the course of natural attrition,22 the stunting 
of the personal development of millions of people, the marginalisation of individuals 
and whole communities, restrictions upon freedom of thought and action, the 
suppression of minority nationalism, corruption, widespread environmental 
degradation, and as enthusiasm turned to apathy the rise of alienation.  
The question of inevitability, of whether revolution in an under-developed country 
inevitably led to such heavy costs of development including authoritarian rule was a 
significant major point of contention among post-war Western scholars.23 This has 
always been an intensely political question: many on the right tended to argue that the 
revolution was not inevitable but once undertaken the Stalin dictatorship flowed 
                                                        
pp.5-30 & 119-151, and Theodore Von Laue, Why Lenin? Why Stalin? A Reappraisal of the Russian Revolution, 
1900-1930, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1964.  
20 Although others have. For very different views, see Sidney & Beatrice Webb, Soviet Communism. A New 
Civilisation, London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1937 and Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain. Stalinism as a 
Civilization, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. 
21 See David L. Hoffman, Stalinist Values. The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity 1917-1941, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2003, and David Hoffman & Yanni Kotsonis (eds), Russian Modernity. Politics, Knowledge and 
Practices 1800-1950, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000. 
22 For attempts to measure this, see Steven Rosefielde, Red Holocaust, London: Routledge, 2010, and Alexander 
Yakovlev, A Century of Violence in Soviet Russia, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002. 
23 For one discussion of this inevitability debate, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, “What’s Left?”, London Review of Books 
30 March 2017, pp.13-15. 
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inevitably from it, while those on the left accepted the inevitability of the revolution 
but argued that the later dictatorship was conjunctural. The shorthand form this 
argument took was about the relationship between Lenin and Stalin: did Lenin and the 
system he established lead inevitably to Stalin? Those who argued for inevitability 
focused upon those of Lenin’s writings emphasising centralisation, discipline, control 
and the use of force, and upon the suppression of non-Bolshevik forces after 1917 and 
of dissent in the party in 1921. Those disputing inevitability point to Lenin’s writings 
regarding NEP and to the functioning of NEP itself, highlighting the way in which the 
“revolution from above” which ended NEP and created the conditions leading to the 
Terror really were a revolutionary turn away from what Lenin had created. 24 
Historiographically the debate remains open, but much of the steam has gone out of 
the argument because the answer no longer has relevance to the legitimation claims of 
the current Russian regime, unlike the Soviet. 
Although those costs identified above were not inevitable, they were related to the 
initial idealism of the Bolsheviks. Animated by idealistic goals but in practice believing 
themselves confronted by enemies at every turn—Western imperialists, White 
guardists, bourgeois remnants, kulaks, enemies of the people—the rulers of the Soviet 
Union felt liberated from the constraints of “bourgeois morality”. To achieve their 
overriding aim of building a new society, there was the widespread belief that anything 
was acceptable as long as it served that end. This was not a conclusion that all members 
of the Bolshevik elite came to easily (which is reflected in the debate over NEP25), but 
there were sufficient among them who did believe this and were able to win in the 
political conflict at the top of the regime so that they were able to set the tone for all. 
And here Stalin was central. The immense costs involved in winning the civil war, in 
the collectivisation of agriculture and forced-pace industrialisation, and the hardship 
and deaths associated with the unleashing of the so-called “Great Terror” in the 1930s, 
were all rationalised on the basis of “you can’t make an omelette without cracking 
eggs”. These costs were not the inevitable product of either the nature of the Bolshevik 
elite or of revolution in a backward society. They stemmed from the tension between 
the regime’s ideals and the difficulty of achieving them. It was that tension that was 
instrumental both in Stalin coming to power, and in his gaining of broad-based support 
within the party to carry out the measures that he deemed essential. Whether those 
measures were objectively essential is another question. What is important was that 
Lenin and then Stalin was able to convince others that they were, and this was a 
function of the gap between Bolshevik ideals and reality on the ground. Given the gulf 
between the situation they found themselves in and the ideals they professed to want 
to realise, anything that would help to achieve this aim could appear justified. 
So in terms of domestic development, nothing flowed ineluctably from the revolution. 
There were crucial conjunctural points in Soviet history when particular decisions were 
made that, had another choice been made, may have led down a very different path of 
development. Whether to establish a coalition government in 1917 or a single party 
government, whether to use terror tactics against the opposition, whether as Lenin 
seems to have argued toward the end of his life the NEP offered a viable path to 
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Stephen F. Cohen, “Bolshevism and Stalinism”, Robert C. Tucker (ed), Stalinism. Essays in Historical 
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socialism, whether forced-pace industrialisation and agricultural collectivisation were 
appropriate means of building socialism, and whether the Terror was warranted, are 
all decisions that were not preordained, but which set the Soviet Union on a particular 
course. And all may be seen in terms of the reaction to the dissonance between the 
classic ideals and grubby reality. This sort of dissonance is common in revolutionary 
situations as idealism gets battered by the imperatives of holding power and ruling. 
For the Bolsheviks this dissonance was evident right from the start. Because Russia 
was not the advanced industrial country that had been envisaged in the Marxism that 
had shaped their outlook, even before the revolution Lenin had struggled to 
accommodate theory and practical reality as he saw it. The result was a revolution that 
more orthodox Marxists criticised as premature and bound to lead to dictatorship.26  
Central to the Soviet experience and what made it so important, was that it ushered in 
a new development model, hitherto unseen. While the development model of the 
tsarist regime had the state playing a significant role in sponsoring industrial 
development, much of that development remained in private hands.27 As the Russian 
economy was taking off in the decades before the war, it was recognisably a capitalist 
economy with an autocratic political system. The model created by the Bolsheviks was 
very different. With all productive capacity—factories, farms, transport, 
communications—taken under state control and labour mobilisation a major element, 
the economy was clearly not a form of capitalism, at least insofar as that term was 
understood at that time.28 It was a system that came to be called “state socialist” by 
observers in the West. Politically, it was run by a new form of structure, a single party 
which sought to control all aspects of life. This combination of state control of the 
economy and party control of state and society was a new form of polity and one that 
stemmed from the Bolshevik drive toward societal transformation. 
So while the fact of the revolution did not determine the course of subsequent Soviet 
development, it did bring to power the regime which visited these things on society. In 
the realm of counter-factual history, it is highly likely that without the revolution 
Russia would have followed a different developmental trajectory. Any regime in Russia 
after the First World War would have pursued a path of rapid industrialisation, but in 
the absence of Bolshevik ideology that path would likely have been different to that 
which was actually followed. It is unlikely that any non-Bolshevik rulers of Russia 
would have sought to abolish private property and to drive all development through 
the state, with the accompanying results of popular disaffection and institutional 
overload. Similarly, the Great Terror would have been unlikely had Stalin not come to 
power.29 So while the revolution brought the Bolshevik regime to power and set Russia 
on the path it was to follow for the next seven decades, the precise details of that path 
were not preordained by the revolution. 
The Soviet development model had implications not just for Russia, but for the entire 
world. 
                                                        
26 For example, Karl Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 
1971 and Rosa Luxemburg, The Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism?, Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1970. 
27 See John Hobson, The Wealth of States. A Comparative Sociology of International Economic and Political 
Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, ch.3. 
28 Some later critics did label it “state capitalism”. For example, Tony Cliff, State Capitalism in Russia, London: 
Pluto Press, 1974. 
29 Unlikely but not impossible, as the widely divergent cases of Ivan the Terrible, Hitler and Pol Pot make clear. 
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The Revolution and International Politics 
From its establishment in 1917, the Soviet regime was faced by a hostile world. 
Immediately manifested by the outbreak of the civil war and the involvement of some 
of the Western powers on the anti-Bolshevik side, this soon settled into a situation of 
widespread international hostility to the new regime. Although justified initially by the 
Bolshevik withdrawal from the war and the refusal to meet the financial obligations 
that had been taken on by the tsarist regime, the real basis of the hostility lay in 
Moscow’s perceived intentions. The Bolsheviks were open in their aim of overturning 
not just the established international order, but the domestic arrangements in the 
major countries of the West as well. Casting themselves as the vanguard of 
international socialist revolution, the Bolsheviks saw their task as being to promote 
such a development across the world, especially in the economically advanced 
countries of the West, with the establishment of the Communist International 
(Comintern) in 1919 reflective of this. Even when this proselytising zeal had in practice 
been replaced by a more status quo orientation designed to defend the Soviet state 
from its enemies, much of both the action and rhetoric emanating from Moscow was 
perceived in the West as being hostile and challenging.30 
Western fears of Moscow stemmed not just from Soviet military might but from the 
way the communist movement spread across the world, including in their own 
countries.31 Central here was the challenge that the Soviet experiment seemed to pose 
to the way in which Western liberal capitalist society was ordered. The claim to be 
building a communist society which was in all respects superior to the capitalist one 
from which it emerged, was a clear challenge to the West because it suggested that 
there was a different, and far better, way of organising society. This appeared as a viable 
and to many people attractive alternative to the Western capitalist development model, 
and with it to the way in which power was distributed in Western societies, especially 
in light of the contrast between the way in which Western economies suffered from the 
effects of the Great Depression at precisely the same time that the Soviet economy was 
leaping forward under the first and second five year plans. The Soviet Union was thus 
seen as an ideological competitor, not simply a military one. And in the longer term 
this ideological aspect was much more important than the military because it involved 
an existential threat to the established way of doing things in the West; the complete 
transformation of society by a working class enthused by the Soviet example seemed 
potentially in the offing.32 Ruling circles in the West thus had a clear incentive to 
oppose the Soviet Union in order to consolidate the system upon which their power 
rested. 
The reality of this challenge seemed for many to be reflected in the popular 
mobilisation onto the streets in many of the European cities in the 1930s.33 This was 
                                                        
30 For an early study by the person who did the most to shape initial post-war American policy towards the USSR, 
see George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin, New York: Mentor Books, 1960. 
31 For recent histories of international communism, see Archie Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism London: 
The Bodley Head, 2009; Robert Harvey, Comrades. The Rise and Fall of World Communism, London: John 
Murray, 2003; A. James McAdams, Vanguard of the Revolution. The Global Idea of the Communist Party, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017; David Priestland, The Red Flag. Communism and the Making of the 
Modern World, London: Penguin, 2009; Robert Service, Comrades. Communism. A World History, London: Pan 
Books, 2008. 
32 For a study of the “red scare” and its effects in the US, see Nick Fischer, Spider Web. The Birth of American 
Anticommunism, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2016. 
33 For a stimulating study of this period, see Gregory M. Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy. 





most apparent in events in Germany leading to the rise of Hitler. One aspect of this 
was fear of “communism”. The clash between right and left on the streets of Germany, 
and the way in which the left was publicly presented by its opponents, tapped into the 
more general fear of socialism and communism that had already been evident in the 
suppression of the abortive German revolution in 1918-19. The fear of “communism” 
and the need to combat it was a continuing theme within elements of German society. 
It was also a consideration among some of the Western powers who saw a powerful 
Germany as being an important bulwark against the “Bolshevik menace”.  
Ultimately for the Western powers, the danger posed by Hitler was seen to be more 
immediate than that emanating from the Soviet Union, with the result that they 
reluctantly entered into an alliance with the USSR against Germany to wage war and 
defeat the fascist menace, a victory that would have been unlikely without the Soviet 
contribution. Paradoxically the Western liberal capitalism which the Soviet model had 
sought to transcend, was saved by the USSR. But the friendly relationship, which 
throughout was characterised by a lack of real trust,34 did not last beyond the war’s 
end. 
The principal axis of international politics for the 45 years after the war was hostility 
between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. The expansion of Soviet power into 
east-central Europe, the coming to power of the communists in China and the outbreak 
of the Korean War all confirmed in the minds of leading Western politicians a picture 
of the Soviet Union as an aggressive, expansionist power. The response was the 
Truman doctrine which was designed officially to “contain” and later to “roll back” 
Soviet expansion. “Soviet expansionism” remained the paradigm through which 
Western policy-makers shaped foreign policy until 1989 and around which much of the 
global politics of this period turned.35 
In its most public form, the cold war was a military stand-off between two armed 
alliance systems: the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation confronted the Warsaw 
Treaty Organisation, with the principal line of friction running through central Europe. 
The relationship was highly militarised, and through the adherence of many countries 
outside Europe to one side or the other and the view of the non-aligned countries as 
possible arenas of competition, the confrontation was not just European but global in 
dimension.36 In few parts of the world was there not competition between the two 
sides. This global dimension of the competition reflects the way in which the Cold War 
was not simply another major power confrontation familiar from the past. The Cold 
War was different, and that difference stemmed essentially from the Russian 
revolution. 
The Cold War was not only a military contest; it was an ideological and economic 
conflict as well. With the rationale of the communist system being the creation of a 
social order superior to that in the West, the stand-off between the two sides was at its 
                                                        
34 See David Reynolds, “The diplomacy of the Grand Alliance”, Richard J.B. Bosworth & Joseph A. Maiolo (eds), 
The Cambridge History of the Second World War. Volume II. Politics and Ideology, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015, pp.301-323.  
35 Histories of the cold war are legion. Particularly useful for questioning some of the more established approaches 
are John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War. A New History, New York: Penguin, 2005; Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s 
Cold War. From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011; and Odd 
Arne Westad (ed), Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, London: Frank Cass, 2000. 
36 On the Cold War in the Third World, see Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007. 
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heart a competition about which system was the best, a competition defined in many 
people’s minds as about which could best provide for its citizens the sort of standard 
of living and portfolio of freedoms to which they aspired. Central to this was economic 
performance, with each side straining to outperform the other, so the relationship was 
also one of economic competition. They were involved in a debate about both the most 
appropriate model of economic organisation and the nature of the society each wished 
to promote.37 Also important was the cultural sphere, which both sides sought to use 
to demonstrate the superiority of their respective systems.38 It was this ideological 
aspect of the Cold War that made it unlike previous confrontations, but that also made 
it relevant to the rest of the world in a way that a purely military confrontation was not. 
The early decades of the Cold War was also the period of decolonisation, when large 
parts of Asia and Africa cut their colonial ties with their former European masters and 
embarked on the global scene as independent states. Both sides of the Cold War 
expended considerable energies on trying to sell the advantages of their own systems 
to the leaders of these newly independent states. In the 1960s it was by no means clear 
which was the easier sell, Western capitalism or Soviet socialism. With the Soviet 
economy continuing to grow, a universal welfare and social support system, and a 
society that seemed to be advancing by leaps and bounds as symbolised by Soviet 
achievements in the space race—the launch of sputnik in 1957 and the first man in 
space in 1961—Khrushchev’s boast that “we will bury you” struck a positive note among 
many in what came to be called the Third World.39 The rejection of colonial domination 
seemed to go easily with appreciation of the advantages of the Soviet system; state-
driven development seemed to promise rapid economic growth with the capacity to 
reshape society in accord with the elite’s wishes, a heady combination for newly-
emergent national leaders. The result was that there were real Western fears of 
significant Soviet advances in the Third World, and in the 1960s this fear seemed 
credible. In the words of Eric Hobsbawm, “A mere thirty to forty years after Lenin’s 
arrival at the Finland Station in Petrograd, one third of humanity found itself living 
under regimes directly derived from the ‘Ten Days That Shook the World’ (Reed, 1919) 
and Lenin’s organizational model, the Communist Party.”40 
The basis for this had often actually been established earlier. Nationalist movements 
in the colonial territories were often headed by individuals who had been educated in 
the colonial metropole where they had been brought into contact with a range of ideas, 
including socialism. For some of them the Russian revolution was a catalytic 
experience, opening up a range of possibilities not open to them before, and persuading 
them to take up a socialist or even a communist stance. For example, many of the 
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leaders of the Chinese revolution (like Zhou Enlai, Li Lisan and Deng Xiaoping) and of 
the Vietnamese revolution (including Ho Chi-Minh) along with post-colonial leaders 
in Franco-phone Africa like Leopold Senghor spent time in France, while many who 
came to head former British colonies were educated in Britain (for example, Lee Kwan 
Yew).41 Some, including Ho, even spent time in Moscow. For many such people, left-
wing politics was almost the default position because it naturally aligned with anti-
colonialism, and this in turn lined up with the principles of the Russian revolution and 
the state which emanated from it. 
Most of the fears of Western leaders proved to be unfounded. Very few of the former 
colonies actually became closely aligned with the Soviet Union. Even among those 
countries that adopted elements of the Soviet model,42 chiefly single party rule and a 
command economy, many did not become politically actively aligned with the Soviet 
Union. The major exception to this, and the one that most frightened Western leaders, 
was China. The Chinese Communist Party was established in 1921 on a wave of 
enthusiasm for the Russian revolution among left-wing Chinese intellectuals. It was 
this organisation that was victorious in 1949, creating the Chinese People’s Republic 
and entering into an alliance with the USSR. Although the alliance was not to last, the 
creation of this new communist power changed the dynamic of the Cold War. 
But the Chinese case was the exception rather than the rule; many Third World states 
sought to tread the path of neutrality rather than aligning themselves with one side in 
the Cold War. However this was not the perception in leading Western capitals in the 
1960s, 1970s and into the 1980s. Western leaders were so used to interpreting global 
events through a paradigm of an expansionist Soviet Union, that most developments 
in the third world were seen in this way. This zero sum approach meant that where 
national liberation movements were fighting either against colonial rule or the post-
colonial government, they were tarred with the brush of Soviet or Chinese agents.43 
This view was strengthened by the way the Soviet Union did often provide assistance 
to such movements, but Western decision-makers failed to see that such assistance did 
not automatically tie these groups closely to the Soviet Union.  
This perception of expanding Soviet influence in the Third World fed directly back into 
the primary attitude to the Soviet Union on the part of Western leaders: the view of the 
USSR as an expansionist power held by most Western governments was reinforced by 
the wave of anti-Westernism in the Third World. The response was usually a 
strengthening of Western, especially American, military might. This had direct 
implications for Western societies, noted below. It also meant that until around 1989, 
military threat and the danger of a military outbreak remained a realistic possibility in 
the minds of many, policies like détente notwithstanding. The militarisation of 
international relations that was part of the Cold War was on the Western side a direct 
result of this perception of the Soviet Union as an expansionist power.44 
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This default position blinded Western policy makers to a more nuanced view of Soviet 
policy. By stereotyping the Soviet Union in this way, Western decision-makers were 
denied flexibility in understanding Soviet developments and inclined always to see 
those developments in the worst possible light. This is well illustrated by the difficulty 
many had in recognising the implications for major change involved in the rise of 
Mikhail Gorbachev to the Soviet leadership in 1985. The path travelled by Ronald 
Reagan shows that such blindness did not have to be permanent; he shifted from 
condemnation of the “evil empire” and the promotion of the “star wars” missile defence 
system in 1983 and the mock announcement of the imminent bombing of the USSR in 
1984, to (along with Gorbachev) setting in train the end of the Cold War.45 But many 
Western statesmen had difficulty seeing beyond the established paradigm. 
In this sense, the Cold War rested upon a Western view of the Soviet Union and a Soviet 
view of the West that stemmed essentially from the outcome of the Russian revolution: 
an expansionist, ideologically-driven power intent upon extending the sway of its 
ideology and national power across the globe, and a West as unalterably committed to 
the rollback of Soviet power and the overthrow of the Soviet regime. How accurate 
these views were is a matter of some dispute. As Soviet growth rates slowed and the 
dream of the communist future faded among its citizens, both from the late 1960s, its 
missionary zeal ebbed away, although its great power aspirations remained. And in this 
regard, it continually searched for advantage in the international arena, but this was 
not directly linked with the ideals emanating from the revolution. Nevertheless, 
Western decision-makers continued until the end of the 1980s to see an expansionist 
power driven by ideological certitude even though such a paradigm distorted their 
understanding of what the country was really about. 
This propensity to see the Soviet Union as inherently expansionist has unfortunately 
become so embedded in Western outlooks that it continues to infect policy towards 
Russia today.46  Within the West, the frame through which contemporary Russian 
actions is seen is overwhelmingly that notion of expansionism that was intrinsic to the 
view of the Soviet Union. In this regard, Russia is seen as a revanchist power, trying to 
recover the glories of the Soviet past, and Putin is cast as a throwback to that period 
who wants to restore the USSR. 47  Clearly Russia shares many of the geopolitical 
imperatives of the Soviet Union, and therefore many of the responses are likely to be 
similar. But this should not blind us to the very important differences between the two, 
including a political system with (limited) contestation, a hybrid state-private 
economy, the absence of a formal ideology, and the much greater freedom enjoyed by 
the populace. Russia is not the USSR-lite. The interpretation of Russian foreign policy 
remains a vexed question among scholars,48 but one thing that is clear is that assuming 
from the outset that Russia is an expansionist power hinders the ability to understand 
Russian action and intent. And to see it simplistically as seeking to restore the USSR, 
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despite the nostalgia for that period and the continued use of some of the symbols of 
that era, is to misunderstand contemporary Russia and its leaders. In this sense, one 
hundred years on, Russia is still suffering under the paradigms of Western policy 
generated in response to the Russian revolution. 
The Revolution and Western Domestic Politics 
While global politics was shaped fundamentally by the Russian revolution, the state 
that emerged from that revolution and the reaction to it, so too was Western domestic 
politics. The revolution had a major influence on the development of left-wing and 
oppositionist politics in general in all the major countries of the West. Leftist politics 
had been present well before the revolution. Socialist and working class politics had 
been evident from early in the nineteenth century, 49  labour parties had been 
established in many countries including Britain in 1900 and Australia in 1901, the first 
labour government in the world came to power in Australia in 1904, while trade unions 
had been active in Britain from the eighteenth century. But the Russian revolution 
stimulated a new development, the emergence of a more organised extreme left wing 
of the labour movement. 
The emergence of an organised extreme left around communist parties occurred in the 
wake of the Russian revolution. Spurred on by the success in Russia, activists formed 
communist parties in many of the countries of the West, including the US in 1919, 
Britain, France and Australia in 1920, and Italy in 1921. 50 The emergence of such 
parties was a matter of major concern for governments of both right and left 
persuasions; the former because they opposed virtually everything the communists 
stood for, the latter because they feared both being outflanked on the left and 
infiltration and take over by communist activists (so-called “entrism”). As a result, 
communist organisations often operated under a series of legal and practical handicaps 
as their opponents sought to place obstacles in their way (see below). The communists 
generally played into the hands of their opponents because of the way they were often 
split on doctrinal issues and, after 1961, by their reaction to the Sino-Soviet split. At 
the same time the broader socialist left was split between those who thought the only 
path to power was through revolution while others believed in the “parliamentary road 
to socialism”. The former, revolutionary, road was the one favoured by Moscow and 
pressed on local communist parties, although there were tactical departures from this 
line.  
In most Western countries, the communist parties remained fringe organisations, with 
little popular support. Only in France and Italy did they become mainstream parties 
after the war.51 But the communist movement in most countries suffered a major blow 
in 1956 when Khrushchev’s policy of destalinisation punctured the leftist image of the 
Soviet Union under Stalin, followed by the Soviet invasion of communist Hungary, and 
twelve years later of Czechoslovakia. For many within the communist movement, the 
Czech invasion marked the death knell of reform communism. Those parties like the 
French Communist Party that refused to condemn the invasion saw their support base 
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erode while the Italian party, that did reject this, underwent regeneration under a new 
leader. Nevertheless, there was widespread disillusionment within communist ranks 
in the wake of these developments, and many left.52 The movement, ever fissiparous, 
was also hurt by the Sino-Soviet split, which became evident in the early 1960s and 
caused many national communist movements to split as people took sides in that 
dispute. These sorts of organisational problems reinforced the marginalisation of the 
communist movement in most Western societies. 
But the importance of the communist movements in the West did not lie in the votes 
they could accumulate in elections. It lay in what those movements represented. They 
represented the ideals of the Russian revolution, the belief that a better society could 
be built than the one in which they lived, that the ills of poverty, unemployment, 
illiteracy and subjection were not inevitable. Into the 1960s, they represented hope, 
and the belief that the downtrodden were not destined to remain forever in the 
situation in which they found themselves. Things did not have to remain the way they 
were. In the wake of the 1929 depression and the Second World War, they seemed to 
promise hope for the future. Many intellectuals, among others, flocked to their banner 
in light of these appeals.53 In this sense, the revolution was an important stimulus for 
the growth of a vibrant and creative leftist intelligentsia which was able to exercise 
significant influence on the public culture of Western democracies as well as to 
generate hope for a better world. They were central to such important debates as those 
about the relative role of state and market in the economy, the nature of democracy, 
and whether liberty was possible without equality.54 
Although these movements remained internally tendentious, argumentative and prone 
to splits, often over seemingly trivial ideological points, this history of division and 
infighting did not diminish the appeal of the ideals which had motivated them initially. 
These ideals provided an anchoring point for left politics in Western societies, in the 
sense that for those leftist forces closer to the mainstream of politics than the 
communists, those ideals represented the standard from which one could not deviate 
too much and retain the leftist banner. This does not mean that mainstream leftist 
forces, like the labour parties in Britain and Australia or social democratic parties in 
Europe, adopted communist ideology, but many of the positions they took on basic 
issues were extensions (usually in a more moderate direction) of positions enunciated 
by the communists. This is why it was relatively easy for people to move from the 
communist fold into the labour one; it did not involve the total rejection of all former 
positions, but the adoption of stances that were recognisably related to those they had 
taken before. 
However this anchoring role was destroyed by two developments. First, the growth of 
post-class politics. As Western societies became ever more wealthy and distributive 
states were able to share some of that wealth around, living standards rose and the old 
bases upon which class politics had rested disintegrated. This occurred around the 
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same time as post-Czechoslovak invasion disillusionment set in within the communist 
movement, meaning many on the left began to search for alternatives. They found 
them in growing movements like environmentalism, feminism, gay rights and even 
messianic religions. As “values” came to be seen as more important than “class”55 and 
the affiliation of voters therefore became more problematic, the issue of what left-wing 
parties stood for became acute. This problem was exacerbated by the second 
development, the collapse of the Soviet Union and of communism in Europe (added to 
the shift away from communist principles in China, Vietnam and Cuba). With the 
collapse of the USSR, the Soviet experiment was widely deemed to be a failure.56 In 
effect this was interpreted to mean that the ideals of the revolution were just that, 
ideals, and could not be realised in practice. The anchoring point for leftist politics in 
the West thereby disappeared, leaving left-wing politicians to flounder looking for 
something to stand for. Their problem is that without something like the ideals of the 
revolution, the positions they adopt appear to have little substance.  
So the Russian revolution was crucial to the structuring of domestic politics in the West 
because its ideals constituted a source of stability for left- wing politics. It was also 
crucial domestically in two other senses. First, the political elites' fears about the 
“communist menace” were translated into measures designed to limit and restrict 
working class organisation and activity. Against a background of often powerful 
rhetoric about the “red threat”, Western governments introduced various measures, 
including restrictions on labour union organisation and action, anti-strike provisions, 
measures against sedition and “pernicious political activities” (the US Hatch Act of 
1939), limits on freedom of speech and assembly, and the banning or attempted 
banning of communist parties and their publications.57 While no other Western state 
had the equivalent of the House Unamerican Activities Committee, with its blacklisting 
of communists and sympathisers, they were all characterised by these sorts of 
measures. This “red fear” also facilitated the growth of internal surveillance. The 
extensive surveillance state that has grown up recently in response to international 
terrorism was built on the foundations of the earlier scares about communism. 
Although the major domestic intelligence agencies were not created in specific 
response to the perceived threat from the left, they soon took this to be one of their 
major tasks,58 and during the Cold War, their resources were substantially enhanced. 
Second, the attitudes that underpinned the Cold War discussed above were translated 
into the domestic political economy through means of high levels of defence spending, 
justified principally in terms of the arms race with the USSR.59 The distorting effect of 
such spending on economies is well known and occurred in all the major Western 
countries, although it was at its most extreme in the US. This emphasis upon defence 
came to be accepted as one of the facts of life of a modern economy. But the 
normalisation of defence spending in this way can lead not only to domestic 
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distortions, but also potentially to international ones. This is illustrated by the way in 
which the Reagan Administration’s plans to develop the “star wars” defence system, in 
addition to its other budgetary policies, massively increased US national debt and its 
reliance on the international economy. As the largest national economy, any 
dislocation in the US economy has a substantial ripple effect through the global 
economy, as the 2008 financial crisis demonstrated. Although the American view of 
the Soviet Union was not the sole cause of this development, it did play a significant 
part. The reaction on the part of Western ruling circles to the Soviet Union and what it 
was perceived to stand for has thus been an important factor in shaping both domestic 
political contours and the political economy of the contemporary Western state.  
Conclusion 
The Russian revolution was the most important development in the twentieth century. 
Not only did it shape the course of development of the geographically largest country 
in the world, but through the reaction of others to it, it shaped both the international 
relations and the domestic politics of the leading countries for almost a century. It also 
had a significant influence culturally, not only through the significant stimulus the 
revolution gave to avant garde art and culture more generally, 60  but in the state 
promotion of such art forms as ballet, theatre, painting and architecture. The Soviet 
impact on culture was clearly not all positive—the deadening effect of socialist realism 
especially on literature and the constraints upon artists of all sorts were clearly not 
positive—but its cultural impact both domestically and internationally was significant. 
But the continuing relevance of the revolution remains uncertain. Its role as the 
originator of an alternative form of modernity, and therefore as a major challenge to 
the liberal capitalist West, has passed. No longer does it make sense to see the 
revolution as the principal factor structuring international politics. But its legacy lives 
on in other ways. For example, the embedding of economic, social and cultural rights 
in international law reflects the earlier adoption of these in formal Soviet constitutional 
documents. In the economic sphere, the main alternative to some form of Western 
capitalism is one which combines state and private enterprise, as reflected in both 
contemporary Russia and China and having its roots in the Soviet experience. And as 
the Arab Spring of 2011 demonstrated, the notion of revolution remains a potential 
option in the eyes of many of those who feel disadvantaged by current political 
arrangements, and while revolution continues on the agenda, the example of 1917 will 
remain potent. After all, the values that underpinned revolution in 1917—equality, 
freedom, justice—remain relevant today, and if political leaders continue to ignore 
them, they may suffer the same fate as the vanquished of 1917. 
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